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Abstract
The title of this essay matches its ambition: its purpose is nothing less than to define magic in 
modern  philo sophical terms. Yet the Wittgensteinianism of the title also reflects the  irony of this 
ambition: through the  metaphor of a thrice thrown die, the essay foregrounds the aleatoriness 
of its argument and the elusiveness of its object. Magic, it will be argued here, is a quality that is 
ascribed to a given object, and it is in that ascription, in the  predicative assertion that a thing possesses 
magic, that its logic must be sought.  However, rather than scan the history of esoteric or occult 
thought for such assertions, the essay will draw upon Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of  Christianity 
and Jean-Paul Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of  the Emotions to argue that magic is not so much a quality 
in itself as it is the emotional transformation of a pre-existing quality.  Following  Sartre’s view that 
emotion effects a magical transformation upon the world, the essay will conclude by  arguing that 
the ascription of magic to a thing is true only if the very act of assertion transforms its ascriptive 
logic —  emotionally, and, therefore, magically.
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Imagine discovering in some distant field a small object of blackish hue. 
 Dodecahedral, with edges too sharp and regular to be hand-hewn, each of its 
marmoreal faces is furrowed with groups of whitish lines, some curved and some 
jagged, others crossed with additional dashes; smooth and solid to the touch, it 
lacks the compaction of stone and the grainy cut of wood. As you weigh and 
ponder it, its plastic body glinting with the moisture of freshly troubled earth, it 
strikes you as being of immense age, as if it had lain there for centuries, absorbing 
time like water. And though you do not comprehend the markings, which you 
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think may represent a fragment of an alphabet, there appears to be a system of 
permutation that dictates their order and relation, and you are sure that, with the 
proper tools, you will be able to decipher their intent. 
Imagine then that this object prompts you to utter the word magic. 
 Depending on the  circumstances of your discovery, what you mean by this 
word will vary. Assuming that you are an  anthropologist, you will perhaps 
hazard the guess that this object has played some minor role in a complex 
ritual. Alternatively, if you are a folklorist with an interest in material culture, 
you may find yourself enthralled by the talismanic qualities of the object: you 
sense there the presence of  emotions once felt and beliefs once held, of vanished 
worlds recalled to phantasmatic life. As a literary scholar, you may compare it 
to similar objects as they are found in fictions, more often in  fables and fantasy 
novels than elsewhere, which brings you a step closer to the folklorist; or, if you 
are an  historian of science who is fascinated by the old theory that the natural 
sciences were built on occult foundations, you may see in this well-wrought ar-
tifact a studious effort to model, and perhaps to redirect, the peculiar energies 
of some heavenly body. And if in any of these  incarnations you were familiar 
with  astrological symbols, which, as per the description above, you are not, you 
would recognize the carvings as the ancient signs of the zodiac.
But let me change the description and grant you this recondite knowledge. 
In some variations, you will be aware that the object is a die. In others, you will 
even perceive that this die is the kind that was used in role-playing games. Once 
considered a trifling thing, a specimen might be bought for as little as £1. But 
because you are living in the twenty-third century, it will be evident to you that 
this object was never the mere plaything that previous ages took it to be: it is a 
machine for generating random combinations, and the sphere of being it com-
mands is cut from the same cloth as the  unforetold and unforetellable  future. 
An idol of twelve faces, this piece of plastic is the crafted body of tuché and 
 ananké, of chance and fate rolled together into a single throw that, as a  prophet 
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of old is remembered to have said, jamais n’abolira le hasard.1 That, you will say, is 
its magic, and how you will define this magic depends, again, on whether you are 
an anthropologist or a folklorist, a literary scholar or an historian of science, 
or, to add here a further and more  speculative set of variants, an archeoludol-
ogist or a paleoepistemographer. For although this is the twenty-third  century, 
you will be no closer to a systematic and consistent concept of magic than 
your predecessors were, and, like them, cannot use the word without venturing 
into a thicket of conjunctions and disjunctions, of sympathies and antipathies, 
that shatter the term into as many incommensurable aspects as there are in-
commensurable interpretations of it. The indefinability of magic remains an 
undisputed truth, and you, in all of your disciplinary variations, are cautious 
enough to know that you can never use the word in a rigorously justified way 
without specifying or at least signaling the interpretation to which you adhere. 
Accurate in one sense and erroneous in another, the word remains as splintered 
in its descriptions as it has been for centuries, and you conclude, not without 
justification, that it is best not to elevate any single one above the rest.
That is undoubtedly the right thing to do. Yet as you do so, you inadvertently 
repeat a particular error, a confusion, that has been repeated for centuries before 
you. Granted, this confusion is indeed inadvertent, born as it is from the effort to 
ward off a more serious one, yet a confusion it nonetheless remains: a confusion 
which consists in assuming that this thing called “magic,” being irreducible to its 
merely linguistic formulations, cannot be better understood through a reflection 
on the word “magic” as it is used in a predicative sentence of the form “magic 
is x” or “x is  magic.” In other words, it is assumed — if it is possible to assume 
a notion that does not even cross the  threshold of thematizing consciousness — 
that the question of what magic is cannot be clarified through an analysis of the 
linguistic forms in which it is captured: whatever magic is, whatever magics there 
1. The sage in question, of course, being Stéphane Mallarmé. See Mallarmé, Un coup de dès jamais 
n’abolira le hasard. On Mallarmé as sage, see Robert McGahey, The Orphic Moment, 75–100. 
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may be, linguistic reflection of a formal nature is too linguistic and too formal 
to have anything of value to contribute. On the contrary, the assumption goes, a 
linguistic analysis of “magic,” unless it focuses on the “discursive construction” 
of “magic,” can only muddle the picture: it mistakes what is said of the object 
with the object itself — and thereby leads to an  irremediable confusion of two 
levels that ought necessarily to be kept separate. 
Such, at any rate, is what I, as a philosophically inclined literary scholar, have 
been able to adduce as the central bit of reasoning that is shared across all the dis-
ciplines in which “magic” is a central critical concept: from the fact that there is 
no one sentence that incontestably expresses the essence of magic — “magic is x and 
nothing but x” — it is concluded that it is impossible for magic at all, as a singular 
object, to be fitted within the constraints of a sentential form. Yet that is the error; 
there lies the root of the confusion. And this is the confusion which the present 
essay will seek to clarify. If this claim strikes you as overstated, consider what all of 
your scholarly avatars are doing. And not only the fictional ones, but the real ones 
as well. First of all, in offering their partial impressions of the things they find 
“magical,” they will necessarily identify certain qualities by which this putative 
“magic” is identified. And this they will necessarily do, whether expressly or im-
plicitly, in descriptive sentences of the form “magic is x” (where x is ritual activity, 
reanimation of the past, causal efficacity, etc.). Secondly, however, they im med-
iately efface this descriptive dimension — this stating that “magic is x” — by 
passing over to the side of the object: since we can speak about magic, it evidently 
is something, but because the things we say of it are not all commensurable, the 
definition of magic must not be sought by conceptual means, by trying to define 
the contours of magic as magic, but rather by looking at the multiple contexts in 
which the term is used and the various things which are meant by it. As a conse-
quence, though it is impossible to speak of magic without using predicative lan-
guage, the only legitimate way to examine magic as magic — not as such but rather 
as something thus nameable — is to remember that all this language merely serves 
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— and this is true even in the case of the “discursive construction” of magic — to 
indicate where the real focus of attention lies. In this view, the best a sentence can 
do is to state a particular aspect or instance of something that is called “magic”; 
everything else that it can bring to this question is best left unbrought.
What the following pages will seek to address is this “everything else.” And 
what they will bring to the question is a perspective that, as yet, has not been test-
ed in any of the fields where magic is a central object of interest. My hope with 
this essay is that such a test might be undertaken in the future. In his preface to 
The Occult Mind: Magic in Theory and Practice, Christopher Lehrich calls for a truly 
interdisciplinary study of magic,2 and it is as a response to this call that I wish 
my intensely abstract and professedly challenging contribution to be taken: it will 
be useful, I believe, for anyone interested in magic to have a more detailed and 
consequential understanding of what it means to use the word “magic” in a truth- 
asserting sentence, and if this essay has any grander objective, it is to facilitate this 
understanding without thereby disenchanting the central object of inquiry. 
Hence the irony — the ironic literalism — of the essay’s title. In his  Tractatus 
Logico- Philosophicus, Ludwig Wittgenstein patiently and rigorously bares the prop-
ositional bones of everything that factually takes place in the world, and it is 
with similar patience and rigour — though, I should hope, with a greater dose 
of humour — that this  essay will seek to clarify the propositional structure by 
which the factual existence of magic is adduced. Briefly, the argument to be put 
forward here consists of three parts, or,  metaphorically, of three throws of the 
magical die. Having shown in the first section that the lack of a universally valid 
concept of magic does not entail its dispersal into pure polyvalence, I will argue 
that the elusiveness of “magic” is partly due to the fact that it can function equal-
ly well as the subject term and the predicate term of a propositional sentence. In 
the second section, I will show that “magic,” when examined as a subject term, 
is in all cases reducible to a set of underlying predicates by which another thing 
2. Lehrich, The Occult Mind, xiii–xiv.
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is determined as the thing that it is. As subject, it is all predicate; as predicate, it 
crumbles into a dust of further predicates; and at this stage it becomes wholly 
impossible to determine how the word should be understood and why it should 
be used in the first place. In the third section, which is the last and lengthiest of 
the essay, I will solve this dilemma by showing that an underlying predicate must 
be understood as the criterion by which a given sentence about magic is judged 
to be either true or false: poetry, for example, is magic when it is extraordinarily 
poetic. From this basis, drawing on Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of  Christianity 
and Jean-Paul  Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of  the Emotions, I argue that magic exists 
only as the emotional transformation of this criterial predicate: wherever there is talk 
of magic, there must be, somewhere in the picture, an experience of this kind. 
However, rather than conclude from this that magic is nothing more than a 
matter of emotion, the figment of a consciousness led astray by the irrational 
power of its affects, I demonstrate, by way of deepening and generalising Sartre’s 
claim, that it is emotions themselves that are magical, that this emotional transfor-
mation is not a transformation of  the predicate by emotion but rather the emotionally 
apprehended self-transformation of the criterial predicate itself: the quality named by 
the predicate becomes magical, in and beyond the sense intended by Sartre, when 
it is removed from its pragmatic and causally determined context and revealed 
in experience as being infinitely what it is. Revealed, in other words, in its essence.
This last sentence points at the ultimate aim of my argument. Rather than 
offer a definition of magic as such, one that is true for all instances where this 
word is or may be used, my wish is to transform Sartre’s philosophical defi-
nition of magic into a properly philosophical magic, a magic internal to philosophy, 
which inverts the relation between explanandum and explanans by asking what 
 happens to the criterion itself when it is magically revealed as infinitely itself. 
To put it briefly and still enigmatically: if  philosophy can give a definition of  magic, 
this is because definition is the magic of  philosophy.3 Thus, still within the third section 
3. By philosophy, of course, I mean here modern philosophy, understanding by that word the form of 
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of the essay, I conclude with the suggestion, more than slightly provocative, 
that there cannot be a philosophical concept of magic, let alone a philosophy 
of magic, that is not oriented in some mode or degree towards a belief  in magic. 
Not towards an assertion that it is real, which would mean that one cannot 
theorize magic without believing in it, nor towards what Jean-Luc Nancy calls 
a “belief without belief,” a “disowning intertwined with an ‘as if’” for which 
magic could only have a fictional existence,4 but rather towards an act of  naming. 
If magic is something, I will argue, it exists as something that can give its name 
to the otherwise unnamable event of a thing being revealed as infinitely itself. 
Such as, for example, the chance discovery in a distant field of a strangely 
marked black object, the object being unnamable to the precise extent that its 
discovery is also the discovery of what this thing portends about itself.
That, at any rate, is the line of thought to be pursued in the following pages. 
Whether the  argument fits the description above — whether, in other words, the 
dice fall with the same sense of urgency and fascination as they are thrown — 
remains to be seen; my only wish in this respect is that it will take less than two 
centuries for us to find out.
1. First throw of  the die: there is no universally valid concept of  “magic”
In their editorial introduction to the anthology Defining Magic: A Reader, 
 Bernd-Christian Otto and Michael Stausberg argue that the concept of magic 
should no longer be used as an overarching category in the study of religion: in ad-
dition to being  ethnocentrically biased and ideologically problematic, the word is 
semantically too diverse and conceptually too heterogeneous to function properly 
in the role that it is typically assigned.5 However, since the word shows no signs of 
rational thought that begins with Descartes and still constitutes the foundation of our contemporary 
episteme: one in which, as the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben writes, the ancient differentiation 
between human and divine knowledge has given way to a unified cogito for which no human experience 
counts as knowledge unless it is sanctioned by science. See  Agamben, Infancy and History, 17–24.
4. Nancy, Adoration: The Deconstruction of  Christianity II, 95.
5. Otto & Stausberg, “General Introduction,” 10.
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going away, the authors attempt to square this circle by showing that the concept 
of magic does not need to be abandoned but may instead be rescued in and by its 
inherent multiplicity. Indeed, as Otto and  Stausberg show, the plurality of mean-
ings and practices that make it unable to stand as a  “supreme  metacategory” may 
itself be made more exact by being subjected to a degree of formalizing pressure.6 
To this end, rather than speak of magic as such, of magic itself, they argue that we 
should speak of patterns of  magicity, of “forms and conditions of structural stabili-
ty” that permit certain characterizations and conceptions of “magic” to occur and 
re-occur across discursive, cultural, and temporal differences.7
It is on these recurrent characterizations and conceptions that the formaliz-
ing pressure is applied. After disowning all pretensions to scientificity, the au-
thors devise a  notation which brings those same pretentions fully and ironically 
into play: word magic is graphed as “MWOR,” sign magic morphs into “MSIG,” 
while the attempt to control the desires of others acquires the abbreviated form 
of “MDES” — and so on and so forth.8 Here, each use of the word “magic” is 
 indexed to a particular context of interpretation that is indicated by the sub-
script letters, and because each context can be treated as a relatively stable totali-
ty of beliefs and practices, the semantic and historical vagueness that plagues the 
word, with one sense of “magic” smudged into another by the passage of time, is 
effectively broken up into chunks or modules that would together constitute the 
proper object of the field.9 Thus, for example, the formula “MWOR” “is derived 
from the recurrent observation that humans tend to ascribe efficacy to the utter-
ance of specific words in ritual sequences and that this pattern of ascription is 
attested cross-culturally in a multiplicity of sources.”10 Similarly, “MEVA”  refers 
to “modes of evaluation of ritual activities conducted by specific actors and the 
views on, and  social position of, such actors.”11 For this reason, the patterns 
6. Ibid., 11.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. See Asprem, “Patterns of Magicity,” 132.
10. Otto & Stausberg, “General Introduction,” 11.
11. Ibid.
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“do not automatically involve ‘MAGIC’ (as the supreme meta-category), nor are 
they ‘magic’ (as referring to ontological features), but they are a way of dealing 
with cross-culturally attested observations. ‘Magicity’ acknowledges the fact that 
they were traditionally assigned to the overall category  ‘MAGIC’ in which we 
have stopped believing.”12 If it is not immediately obvious whether this yields 
any greater clarity, the attempt, at any rate, is commendable, for, as may be seen 
from the following list, there is indeed a great deal of clarifying to be done. 
Magic, the authors write, has been described as being:
- coercive;
- manipulative;
- seeking to exercise control of others or change the state of things or other 
human beings;
- interventionist;
- purely mechanical;
- powerful, self-efficacious ritual action;
- analogical/symbolic/sympathetic;
- typically operative in the form of contagion or similarity;
- imitative and/or mimetic;
- instrumental ritual action with limited aims and scope;
- a practice of obtaining ordinarily unavailable this-worldly benefits;
- a ritual counter-measure against “witchcraft” attacks;
- performed on “critical” occasions;
- based on associative thinking;
- immune to falsification;
- compulsive, hallucinatory behaviour;
- based on a non-ordinary “participatory” worldview or consciousness;
- derived from strong emotions such as anger or fear, related to desires;
- related to (supernatural, invisible) agents or agency typically distinct from gods;
12. Ibid.
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- non-legitimate dealing with the supernatural;
- private and/or secret;
- egocentric and/or autistic;
- antisocial or related to societal sub-groups;
- performed by self-employed, non-institutionalized specialists (the 
 “magicians”) serving their clients;
- lacking institutional (infra)structures;
- a specific kind of technique, art or craft requiring special knowledge and/
or training;
- associated with “others” such as marginalized groups or outsiders;
- a category and discursive practice of denunciation of “others”;
- immoral or lacking moral considerations;
- characterized by strange or exotic behaviours;
- characterized by a distinctive use of language and words;
- an illocutionary or performative (speech) act;
- producing miraculous events;
 - an art of creating illusions, also employed in entertainment.13
I have cited this list in full for no other purpose than that of added perplexity — 
and the clarification that it consequently invites. Exhausting as it is, the list is far 
from exhaustive, and it may readily be seen why the authors have tried to find a 
way around it without resorting to an essentialism that treats all these descriptions 
as particular species of the genus “magic.” Rather, they have given themselves a 
theoretical tool that enables them to denote an attestable practice of naming, and 
what they will find named in this practice of naming, rather than magic in itself 
and as such, is always a set of qualities that are perceived in some historical context 
as magical. These qualities constitute patterns that may be found in the historical 
record and discussed with the same degree of objectivity as any other historical 
phenomenon. And since it is only by their descriptive accuracy that these patterns 
13. Ibid., 9–10.
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may be evaluated, a not inconsiderable degree of vagueness is dissolved. Because 
each use of the word is indexed to a particular context or pattern that is explicable 
in its own terms, it is unnecessary to refer this particular “magic” to any other 
“magic.” Though various patterns may be cross-referenced and correlated, they are 
permitted, if need be, to remain in isolation from each other.14
This, however, is problematic for at least two related and immediately evi-
dent reasons. The first is that the model is valid only if the researcher assiduous-
ly refrains from the theoretical business of defining and determining the object 
being researched. Otherwise, the model would constitute yet another pattern 
of magicity and thereby lose its standing as a metatheory of magic. However, 
although this detachment is indeed necessary, it deprives Otto and Stausberg of 
a substantial criterion by which to distinguish a legitimate “pattern of magicity” 
— one that arises from a consistent ontological commitment — from a merely 
spurious one that involves nothing more than the app lication of  the  l abel to 
any given thing. The difficulties that ensue are multiple, because the lack of 
a criterion means that every single mention of magic must by rights count as 
a “pattern of ascription” that “is attested cross-culturally in a multiplicity of 
sources”15 — even when the ascription (i.e. the formal assertion that x is magic) 
and the attestation (i.e. the objective fact that some x has been asserted to be 
magic) call for entirely different concepts and methodologies.
And this is where the second problem arises. A pattern of magicity, we have 
seen, is a pattern of magicity only if it is explicitly referred to magic or some 
roughly synonymous term. If not, this pattern will be a pattern of something 
other than magic. As a consequence, within the framework set up by Otto and 
Stausberg, a pattern of magicity is never just a pattern of magicity.  Owing to this 
necessity of explicit reference, a pattern of magicity is also a verbal  pattern, and not 
just any old pattern made of such and such words, but a strictly  propositional one: 
14. Ibid., 12.
15. Ibid., 11.
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considered analytically, a “pattern of magicity” may be broken down into a set of 
predicate terms that are attributed to magic as a subject term, and if there is any truth 
in speaking of “patterns of magicity,” everything that may be seen as forming 
such a pattern must be similarly structured. In other words, to say  that a thing is 
“magic” is to affirm its “magicity,” and this happens by identifying a certain set 
of attributes that are taken to constitute that magicity. As a result, formulas like 
“MHAR” (magic as harming others by ritual means), “MOBJ” and “MPLA” 
 (magic as the efficacity of objects or places) or “MMIR” (magic as the possession 
of miraculous capacities) are shown to be theoretically beguiling and slightly 
showy translations of simple sentences which say neither more nor less than that 
“magic is x,” “magic is y,” or “magic does z and causes q.”16 In the end, there-
fore, what Otto and Stausberg have to offer is less the new metatheory of magic 
they purport it to be than a novel taxonomy of magic-referring expressions. It is, 
to be sure, an elegant solution, but its elegance is sorely vitiated by this lack of 
theoretical reflexivity. Furthermore, to make matters worse, this second problem 
compounds the first: if there is no formally consistent criterion by which to dis-
tinguish a legitimate pattern from a spurious one, this means by the same token 
that a true proposition cannot be distinguished from a false one.17
16. Ibid.
17. One way out of this cul-de-sac is indicated by Kimberly B. Stratton’s essay “Magic  Discourse 
in the Ancient World” in Defining Magic. “What gets labelled magic is arbitrary,” Stratton writes, 
“and depends upon the society in question. Once the label is affixed, however, it enables certain 
practices to become magic by virtue of being regarded as such by members of the society. Magic 
becomes real by virtue of being conceived” (Stratton, “Magic Discourse,” 246–47). One may 
recognize here the Foucauldian approach that Stratton has elsewhere brought forcefully to bear 
on stereotypical representations of magic and witchcraft in European antiquity. See Stratton, 
Naming the Witch, 15–18. However, given that the discursive fiat by which this transformation is 
achieved is explicitly a passage from the false statement to the true, the structural distribution 
of the true and the false remains in place and must be interrogated as such. That, briefly, is what 
I am trying to do in this part of the essay.
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2. Second throw of  the die: magic is grammatical
Whether it is true or false, a sentence about magic is just that: a sentence about 
magic. Thus, from this perspective at least, the historical and semantical vague-
ness of “magic” is not the most disastrous of conditions. For what is not vague, 
or at least is decisively less so, is the logical grammar that governs the use of the 
word. Because there are only a few functions that the word can fulfil in a prop-
ositional sentence, and since these functions are in turn bound by rules of logic, 
they will necessarily limit the ways in which the word may be legitimately used. 
In other words, “magic,” regardless of the many conflicting patterns in which it 
can be recognized and recollected, is in this respect neither more nor less vague 
than any other word that can be used in a grammatically correct sentence. This 
may be ascertained by looking at the following examples:
a) Magic is poetry.
b) Poetry is magic.
In both sentences, “magic” is evidently a noun. In a, it is the subject of which “poetry” 
is the predicate; in b, it is the predicate ascribed to the subject “poetry.” These, how-
ever, are not the only forms it can take, as may be seen from the next four samples:
c) There is no magic bullet.
d) It was a magical summer.
e) Magical beliefs are afoot.
f) The pumpkin was magicked into a horse-drawn carriage.
In sentence c, “magic” remains a noun: its function is to modify the one that directly 
follows it. In sentence d, it is adjectivized: the “magical” is a quality that may charac-
terize a particular thing. Even there, however, its root form is substantive and requires 
a precomprehension of the thing denoted: a summer cannot be aptly described as 
“magical” (or, for that matter, as “sunny”) if the speaker has no conception of what 
the noun “magic” (or, indeed, “the sun”) denotes. The same applies to e, where the 
adjective functions as a transferred epithet and simply indicates the magical content 
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of the belief: magical beliefs are beliefs in the real and effective existence of magic (re-
gardless of how “magic” is construed). Finally, in f, the word “magic” is transformed 
into a verb that is, like the adjectives in sentences d and e, meaningless without a 
prior understanding of what magic is (such that the ability to “magic” means the 
capacity to effect a change “as if by magic”). As regards Otto and Stausberg, it should 
be noted that these grammatical considerations show just how intractable are the 
problems that they sought to evade. Briefly, their notion of “magicity” (the quality 
or condition of having “magic”) is easily resolved by observing that it is synonymous 
or logically  equivalent with the adjective “magical.” In turn, this adjective, as has just 
been seen, has no meaning if it does not refer back to the noun “magic.” As a conse-
quence, therefore, the invention of “magicity” does not solve the problem of “magic” 
in the least: it only camouflages the latter under a layer of merely seeming precision.
But let us return to the example sentences. In all six cases, magic is a noun 
that denotes a specific thing. If there is anything vague about these sentences, 
this vagueness lies in the fact that the thing denoted by the word is not an 
object at all in any straightforward sense of the term. If this was not evident 
before, the conclusion becomes inescapable when one pays closer attention to 
the two functions that the word may have in a propositional sentence:
1) As a subject term, “magic” refers to an object that is characterized by a fi-
nite set of  attributes: “magic” is what is x but not y, or y but not z, or z but 
not x. Here, for example, it denotes the things that sentences a–f were respec-
tively seen to presuppose: magic as verbal power in a, magic as enchantment 
in b, magic as literal or metaphoric spell in c, and so on and so forth.
2) As a predicate term, “magic” expresses an attribute belonging to another  object: 
poetry, for instance, can be many things, depending on how it is  defined, and 
there are many definitions in which it is characterized by a  “magic” of some 
sort. In this case, a specific interpretation of magic is first selected as salient 
and then transferred onto the subject of the sentence: the  particular “magic” 
that poetry is said to possess is only one “magic” among many others.
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In its first function, magic is constituted by the set of properties that are attribut-
ed to it. In its second function, magic is constitutive of another thing by adding 
its own properties to those of the thing of which it is said. At first glance, this 
appears to be a firm and stable distinction. Since “magic” is in both cases a 
noun, the latter function (magic as constitutive) appears to refer back to the 
first (magic as constituted). This is because, as was stated above, the possibility 
of attributing magic to some other object is assumed to depend on a precon-
ception of what “magic” means, or, in other words, of the qualities that consti-
tute “magic” as “magic.” On a closer look, however, the reference to constitution 
reveals this assumption to be more problematic than one might at first be 
inclined to believe. A preconception, after all, is nothing more than a set of 
predicative qualities by which we specify the “magic” that we are talking about. 
And since this specification cannot be done on a whim, by some arbitrary fiat 
of pure stipulation, there must in each case be a criterion of  selection to which 
this act of specification is referred. Magic itself, obviously, cannot serve as this 
criterion. Because “magic itself” cannot be conjured out of thin air, every at-
tempt to define “magic”  according to a list of “magical qualities” is a fallacy of 
the virtus dormativa kind: to identify magic by its magical qualities is to identify 
certain qualities as magical — and to do this is necessarily to fall guilty of circu-
lar reasoning, because these qualities must be identified as magical before they 
can serve as the definition of magic. As a consequence, the criterion can only 
be sought in the actual thing to which “magic” is attributed. What is magical 
about poetry, for instance, must be some attribute that actually and verifiably 
characterizes poetry — not poetry as such, in all its instances, but in this or 
that poem, in one stanza or a single verse, in the fine mutation of a prosodic 
 pattern.18 Such attributes, I propose, are best defined as magic-bearing qualities: a 
18. Ezra Pound, echoing Walter Pater, puts this finely in his early study The Spirit of  Romance. 
“Poetry is a sort of inspired mathematics, which gives us equations, not for abstract figures, tri-
angles, spheres, and the like, but equations for the human emotions. If one have a mind which 
inclines to magic rather than to science, one will prefer to speak of these equations as spells 
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quality may be called “magical” if and only if it is able to serve as a qualitative 
substrate for  “magic” (i.e. if and only if its semantic content can be passed over 
to “magic” as the proper definition of the latter). As may be seen from the litany 
cited in the previous section, magic is very near — very near, but not all the way 
— to being parasitic on such qualities: an (apparently) empty term with no (clear) 
identity of its own, it  cannot function (as far as we can tell) without a host.
Whether this characterization is too negative — essentially, rather than 
merely rhetorically — remains to be seen. Yet, grounded in this way, what is 
certain is that “magic” finds itself defined by a set of predicates that is se-
lected according to another set of predicates: poetic predicates in the context 
of poetry, ritualistic in the context of ritual, occulting in the context of the 
occult, ecstatic in an ecstatic context.19 This, as we prepare for the next throw 
of the die, will prove to be decisive for my attempt to grasp the problem of 
“magic” beyond its dispersal into semantical and historical vagueness. When-
ever the word “magic” is used in a sentence, there is an underlying predicate 
or incantations; it sounds more arcane, mysterious, recondite. Speaking generally, the spells or 
equations of ‘classic’ art invoke the beauty of the normal, and spells of ‘romantic’ art are said 
to invoke the beauty of the unusual” (Pound, The Spirit of  Romance, 14). For Pater’s view on the 
mixture of strangeness and beauty, see his Appreciations, 246–47. Another perspective is offered 
by Reuven Tsur in On the Shore of  Nothingness. Tsur draws upon Roman Jakobson in disputing 
the equation of poetry and magic: “In verbal magic and mysticism, the signifier is frequently 
indistinguishable from the signified. God, and the name of God, have sometimes the same 
powers. The sounds of the name of God, and the letters that signify those sounds (e.g., the tetra-
grammaton), have sometimes the same magic power. In this respect, poetry is diametrically op-
posed to verbal magic. In a complex cultural situation of human society in which the automatic 
identification of signifiers with their signifieds may be the source of maladaptive behaviour, the 
signifiers and signifieds must be properly kept apart. It is here where poetry comes in” (Tsur, 
Shore, 209). Bronislaw Malinowski might not agree: magic, he writes, “seems to stir up in everyone 
some hidden mental forces, some lingering hopes in the miraculous, some dormant beliefs in man’s 
mysterious possibilities. Witness to this is the power which the words magic, spell, charm, to bewitch, and 
to enchant, possess in poetry, where the inner value of words, the emotional forces which they still 
release, survive longest and are revealed most clearly” (Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, 51).
19. This is not to say, of course, that magic has only one definition or interpretation in a given 
context. Contexts are not necessarily cut off from each other, and the qualities that are magic-bearing 
in one context will often be found to have carried their magic into another.
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that bears it. And whenever a sentence mentions  “magic,” this mention does 
something to the magic-bearing predicate. Qualifying the quality to which it 
is added, it transforms this quality and the thing determined by this quality 
into something more and something other than it was before: more potent, 
more beguiling, more efficaciously present than it might otherwise be. This 
is wh y its emptiness is not the emptiness of an illusion and its parasitism the 
parasitism of an error. Or, to be more precise, this is why its emptiness is not 
simply a pure absence and its parasitism not just a superficial and surreptitious 
addition. To the contrary: it may well turn out to be the case that “magic” has 
nothing else to commend itself except this capacity for heightened presence.
3. Third throw of  the die: there is always a criterion which decides wheth-
er “magic” is attributable to a thing
Magic as capacity for heightened presence? Ludwig Feuerbach, for one, would 
not abide by such claims. In The Essence of  Christianity, this ingraspable sense 
of something more — the sense of a thing being itself, but with an added and 
strange degree of  profundity — is seized as an opportunity to excoriate religion 
in general — and “Christian  sophistry” in particular — for its obfuscatory and 
obscurantist tendencies. Near the beginning of a chapter that deals with the 
contradiction inherent in the divine nature — namely, that God is at once uni-
versal and personal, infinite and individual — we find this striking paragraph:
A peculiarly characteristic artifice and pretext of Christian sophistry is the doctrine 
of the unsearchableness, the incomprehensibility of the divine nature. But, as will be 
shown, the secret of this incomprehensibility is nothing further than that a known 
quality is made into an unknown one, a natural quality into a supernatural, i.e., an 
unnatural one, so as to produce the appearance, the illusion, that the divine nature is 
different from the human, and is eo ipso an incomprehensible one.20
20. Feuerbach, The Essence of  Christianity, 212.
322
© 2019 Hannu Poutiainen.
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License. 
Published by Correspondences:  Journal for the Study of  Esotericism. 
Poutiainen / Correspondences 7, no. 2 (2019): 305–337
In the previous paragraph, having first stated that the “essence of religion is 
the immediate, involuntary, unconscious contemplation of the human nature 
as another, a distinct nature,”  Feuerbach observes that this “projected image 
of human nature,” as it is taken up as the object of theological reflection, 
“becomes an inexhaustible mine of falsehoods, illusions, contradictions, and 
sophisms.”21 Against this relentlessly critical background, the passage quoted 
above functions as a transition to another discussion, lengthier and yet more 
acerbic than the one preceding it, that deals with the properly imaginary quality 
of divine incomprehensibility. By treating it as imaginary, of course,  Feuerbach 
does not mean that incomprehensibility should be seen as a sign and a spur for 
profounder learning, as Friedrich Schlegel argued in one of his fragments some 
four decades previously: that would be much too romantic, much too ironic for 
his purposes.22 Rather, his point is to show that the idea of an inscrutable God 
emerges from eminently scrutable elements that are rendered mysterious and 
inhuman only by the spontaneous removal of everything that determines them 
as human: finitude, dependence, measure. Furthermore, because this removal 
is indeed spontaneous — or, in Feuerbach’s terms, “immediate,” “involuntary,” 
and “unconscious” — it lends itself effortlessly to the kind of dismantling that 
Feuerbach is engaged in. “In the truly religious sense,” he writes in the next 
paragraph, “incomprehensibility is not the dead full stop which reflection plac-
es wherever understanding deserts it, but a pathetic note of  exclamation marking the 
impression which the imagination makes on the feelings.”23 This association of 
feeling and imagination explains why, for  Feuerbach, “the incomprehensibility 
of God has only the significance of an impassioned expression.”24 What takes us 
by surprise, Feuerbach argues, elicits from us the exclamation that it is “incred-
ible” and “beyond conception,” and since these exclamations are thoroughly 
21. Ibid., 211–12.
22. Schlegel, Fragments, 257–71.
23. Feuerbach, The Essence of  Christianity, 212, my emphasis.
24. Ibid.
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imbued with a pathetic note, a note of pathos, the incomprehensibility that is as-
cribed to God turns out to be nothing other than the imaginatively exaggerated 
and intellectually hyperbolized form of a quintessentially human feeling. For 
the human imagination, many things feel incredible and beyond conception; 
yet God is that which feels absolutely incredible and beyond all conception.
This is what Feuerbach means when he says of the imagination that it is “the 
original organ of religion.”25 Defining this faculty as “the limitless activity of the 
senses” and the nature of God as “the nature of the imagination unfolded, made 
objective,”26 Feuerbach describes religion as the intellectual infinitization of  a finite feeling. 
In religion, everything that limits the imagination is negated, and the imagination, 
thus freed from the dross of human finitude, is granted to a God that feels infinite 
and therefore is infinite. Here, the parallels to my argument as I have developed 
it thus far become evident, and they are nowhere more so than in the specific act 
by which, as Feuerbach writes, “a known quality is made into an unknown one, a 
natural quality into a supernatural, i.e. an  unnatural one.”27 From a strictly formal 
perspective, what this act of  imagination comes to effect is nothing other than the 
transformation of a human quality into a God-bearing quality; furthermore, because this 
formal efficacity does not pass unnoticed by Feuerbach, he is able to redefine the 
language of religion, and specifically of theology, as tantamount to a set of God -
-referring expressions. Or, more precisely, a set of God-referring pathetic exclamations.
But that is not the end of the matter. If imagination is the organ of religion, 
it is equally the organ of magic. Yet magic and religion are not the same, which 
is why it remains to be asked how this organ of emotional infinitization works 
in this somewhat shadowier realm.
This, of course, is a nearly intractable question. However, though answers are 
hard to find, they are, happily, not altogether nonexistent: for, by a stroke of 
luck, if not of magic, it is precisely this that Jean-Paul Sartre comes to elucidate, 
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
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without exactly intending to, in his early essay Sketch for a Theory of  the Emotions. 
In this short work, which gives an overview of then-current psychological theo-
ries of emotion before supplementing them with a relatively detailed phenom-
enological analysis, Sartre deploys the notion of magic in a way that makes up 
in conceptual inventiveness what it lacks in descriptive accuracy.28 What this 
inventiveness consists in will be dealt with shortly. On the latter score, it should 
be noted here that its shortcomings are glaring indeed, and apart from a brief 
mention in Randall Styers’s landmark book Making Magic, which examines the 
way in which “magic” is posited as the counterpart to a putatively rational 
 “modernity,” it is no surprise that the ideas put forward in the essay have passed 
undiscussed by scholars of the subject.29 This choice snippet, quoted by Styers 
in a different translation, gives a good idea of where Sartre is coming from:
The magical, as Alain says, is “the mind crawling among things”; that is, an irrational 
synthesis of spontaneity and passivity. It is an inert activity, a consciousness rendered 
passive. But it is precisely in that form that others appear to us, and this, not because of 
our positions in relation to them, nor in consequence of our passions, but by essential 
necessity; ... It follows that man is always a sorcerer to man and the social world is pri-
marily magical. Not that it is impossible to take a deterministic view of the inter-psycho-
logical world or to build rational superstructures upon it. But then it is those structures 
28. By “descriptive accuracy,” I simply mean the extent to which Sartre’s concept of magic 
can be reconciled with everything that historical and empirical investigation has been able to 
say about “magic” — in other words with Otto and Stausberg’s “patterns of magicity” (and it 
is, among other things, merely one pattern among others). Furthermore, it should be noted 
that Sartre’s theory of magic is fundamentally a theory of the imagination and as such would 
be able to do without the former concept. (On the equivalence that Sartre draws between the 
magical and the imaginary, see O’Shiel, “Sartre’s Magical Being.”) In the following reflections, 
what I am aiming at, ultimately, is the deconstruction of Sartre’s theory of the emotions through 
its appeal to the concept of magic. In other words, the argument will consist, to quote Jacques 
Derrida, “in making appear — in each alleged system, in each self-interpretation of and by a 
system — a force of dislocation, a limit in the totalization, a limit in the movement of syllo-
gistic synthesis” (Derrida & Ferraris, A Taste for The Secret, 4). As will be seen, magic is precisely 
what exceeds Sartre’s system, his phenomenological theory of the emotions, even as it gives this 
theory the force that it needs.
29. Styers, Making Magic, 179.
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that are ephemeral and unstable, it is they that crumble away as soon as the magical 
aspect of faces, gestures and the human situations becomes too vivid. And what happens 
then, when the superstructures laboriously built up by the reason disintegrate, and man 
finds himself suddenly plunged back into the original magic? That is easily predicted; 
the consciousness seizes upon the magic as magic, and lives it vividly as such.30
“Crawling,” “passivity,” “inertia”: that would seem to say it all. For a scholar of 
magic, claims such as these are debatable at best, and their sole merit, if merit there 
is, bears solely on the structure of emotional experience that the essay investigates.
Or does it? Note, at the end of the quotation, these two crucial expressions: 
magic as magic, magic as such. I drew your attention to these objectifying expres-
sions in the introduction and will do so later on. Before that, however, let us 
read what Sartre writes only a couple of pages earlier:
Indeed, there is a world of emotion. All emotions have this in common, that they evoke the 
appearance of a world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful, etc., but in which the relations of things 
to consciousness are always and exclusively magical. We have to speak of a world of emotion 
as one speaks of a world of dreams or of worlds of madness. A world — that means individu-
al syntheses in mutual relations and possessing qualities.... We are living, emotively, a quality 
that penetrates into us, that we are suffering, and that surrounds us in every direction.31
In the world of emotion, then, magic is found in qualities. In other words, there 
is no need to add any magic to a quality. Emotion itself, for Sartre, is nothing 
other than a magical relation to a quality, and if Sartre’s argument holds, we 
may propose, as a hypothesis, that the converse is also true: magic is nothing other 
than an emotional relation to a quality.
But emotional in what sense? The answer to this question entails a decisive 
turn. Thus far, I have adduced my broader argument only abstractly and with-
out any certainty that it might hold true of any given object. Yet Sartre’s account 
changes all this. There, the word “magic” does not refer to yet another “pattern 
of magicity.” Nor, for that matter, does the essay deal with a phenomenon that 
30. Sartre, Sketch, 56–57.
31. Ibid., 53–55.
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can vaguely be called “magical.” Rather, the word “magic” is used there, as it is 
elsewhere in Sartre’s work, because it accurately describes the phenomenon that 
Sartre is trying to understand: when he says that the magical is “an irrational 
synthesis of spontaneity and passivity,” when he describes it as “an inert activi-
ty, a consciousness rendered passive,” this passivity is not primarily a qualitative 
state, although it is that too, but first and foremost it is the state of being an 
object for the other, which, in this case, is not another consciousness, another 
subject, but rather a quality “that penetrates into us, that we are suffering, and 
that surrounds us in every direction.” For this reason, despite the connection 
that scholars and thinkers like Malinowski or Collingwood have drawn between 
magic and emotion,32 what Sartre is grappling with here is in fact something 
altogether different: of all the shorthands available to him, “magic” is the one 
that best expresses a situation in which both mind and world are gripped and 
transformed by a power that is wholly other to either of them.
The implications of this are of paramount importance. For, even if Sartre’s 
broader  description of magic is disputed, it nonetheless satisfies, concretely and 
materially, the two conditions that have been elaborated in the two preceding 
sections. Formalized, they are as follows:
1) A magic-referring expression is true only where it refers to a magic-bearing 
quality: the latter is the criterion of the former.
2) Magic cannot be defined by reference to putatively “magical” qualities: 
when used in a true proposition, the word indicates only that an identifiable 
quality has been transformed into a magic-bearing quality.
Together, these conditions must be understood as stating that a definition of 
32. In an earlier part of the essay, Sartre comes close to Malinowski’s view that the function of 
magic is the management of emotion (cf. Malinowski, Magic, Science and Religion, 51–55). From a 
related perspective, R. G. Collingwood notes in The Philosophy of  Enchantment that the  perception 
of a magical connection between objects is emotionally motivated (Collingwood, The Philosophy 
of  Enchantment, 196–207). More recently, Giorgio Agamben has made the unexpected argument 
— which is the kind of argument that he prefers to make — that magic consists in the felicitous 
knowledge of a thing’s secret name (Agamben, Profanations, 19–22).
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magic is always specific to its object: a true definition of magic for x is not necessar-
ily true for y or z (i.e. where x = emotion, y = physics, and z = poetry). Further-
more, it must be noted that a definition may be simultaneously true for more 
than one class of objects (e.g. for emotion and poetry), whereas for others (e.g. 
physics), there is and cannot be a true definition of magic (in other words, the 
laws of physics preclude, in domains governed by these laws, the existence of a 
physical magic). Bearing this in mind, the single merit of Sartre’s essay is that it 
succeeds in laying out the conditions of  truth for the definition of magic that it 
proposes: judged to be true, a given description is believed to meet these con-
ditions; judged to be false, it does not. Because of this, and strictly within these 
theoretical bounds, it is a completely immaterial question whether Sartre’s theory 
is true or false either partly (i.e. for some aspect of its object) or as a whole (i.e. for 
the object in all its aspects). Whether it stands or falls, it stands or falls according 
to its own criterion, and what matters is that such a criterion can be asserted.
But what is this criterion? Where is it found? And to what extent is Sar-
tre aware of its criterial quality? Here, we must return to the two phrases, the 
two philosophemes, that I evoked twice above: “magic as magic” and “magic as 
such” (“the consciousness seizes upon the magic as magic, and lives it vividly as 
such”33). The most important thing to be observed about these phrases is that 
they function in Sartre’s analysis as phrases of objectification: through them, the 
active attention of the theorist passes over to the thing itself. Yet another ques-
tion immediately follows: from what does the attention of the theorist pass over 
to the thing itself? The answer takes time to formulate, and we must begin with 
what Sartre says immediately after the sentence just quoted. “The categories ‘sus-
picious’ and ‘disquieting,’ etc.,” Sartre writes, “designate the magical, in so far as 
it is being lived by consciousness or tempting consciousness to live it.”34 The mag-
ical: another formula of objectification, now designated by emotional categories 
33. Sartre, Sketch, 57.
34. Ibid.
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such as the two he mentions. But let us keep reading. Halfway through the next 
paragraph, the answer gains additional depth: there is a shift from the internal 
to the external that further blurs the boundary between emotion and object. 
“Consciousness,” Sartre writes, taking as his example the image of a staring face 
that incites terror, “plunged into this magic world drags the body with it in as 
much as the body is belief and the consciousness believes in it. The behaviour 
which gives its meaning to the emotion is no longer our behaviour; it is the ex-
pression of the face and the movements of the body of the other being, which 
make up a synthetic whole with the upheaval in our own organism.”35 Note these 
last words: a synthetic whole with the upheaval in our own organism. What magic is, then, 
prior to its objectification as magic, is a synthesis which involves the external 
dimension in the internal and the internal in the external: when the subjective 
consciousness is an object for the other, the other is thereby brought into the 
innermost sphere of the subject, into the heart of its intimacy with itself, and 
makes it quake with an intensity of affect that no natural occurrence can incite. 
And this happens because the body believes in the magically transformed quality.
This, I feel, is where the answer to the question posed above begins to gain 
real momentum. Returning to the passage quoted above, now reading it at 
greater length, what can be found there is a point of upheaval that is as emo-
tional as it is philosophical: it is one in which the author — the abstract organism 
without which no such thing as the Sketch for a Theory of  the Emotions would exist 
— forms a synthetic whole with the object of his discourse.
Indeed, there is a world of emotion. All emotions have this in common, that they 
evoke the  appearance of a world, cruel, terrible, bleak, joyful, etc., but in which the 
relations of things to consciousness are always and exclusively magical. We have to 
speak of a world of emotion as one speaks of a world of dreams or of worlds of mad-
ness. A world — that means individual syntheses in mutual relations and possessing 
qualities. But no quality is conferred upon an object without passing over into the 
infinite. This grey, for instance, represents the units of an infinity of real and possi-
35. Ibid., 57–58.
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ble abschattungen, some of which will be grey-green, some grey seen in a certain light, 
black, etc. Similarly, the qualities that  emotion confers upon the object and upon 
the world, it confers upon them ad aeternum. True, when I  suddenly conceive an ob-
ject to be horrible I do not explicitly affirm that it will remain horrible for eternity. 
But the mere affirmation of horribleness as a substantial quality of the object is already, 
in itself, a passage to the infinite. The horrible is now in the thing, at the heart of it, 
is its emotive texture, is constitutive of it. Thus, during emotion an overwhelming and 
definitive quality of the thing makes its appearance. And that is what transcends and 
maintains our emotion. Horribleness is not only the present state of the thing, it is a 
menace for the future, it is a revelation about the meaning of the world. The “horrible” 
means indeed that horribleness is a substantial quality, that there is horribleness in the 
world. Thus, in every emotion, a multitude of affective protentions extends into the 
future and presents it in an emotional light. We are living, emotively, a quality that 
penetrates into us, that we are suffering, and that surrounds us in every direction. Imme-
diately, the emotion is lifted out of itself and transcends itself; it is no ordinary episode 
of our daily life, but an intuition of the absolute.36
My aim in the preceding discussion has been to discover the criterion by which 
Sartre’s notion of magic may be judged either true or false. In searching for it, 
I noted that Sartre passes at a key juncture of his discussion from an unobjec-
tified magic to an objectified magic expressed in the formulas “magic as mag-
ic,” “magic as such,” and “the magical.” Finding it imperative not to judge in 
advance what that unobjectified magic might be, I drew several interconnected 
quotations from Sartre’s essay in order to locate the specifically  argumentative 
place, the architectonic rather than simply textual locus, where that passage 
occurs and Sartre finds it possible to begin speaking of “magic as magic,” of 
“magic as such,” of “the magical.” Reading the citation above, we may see that it 
is here that this locus is found, in this passage where Sartre affirms that there is 
horribleness in the world, and it is found as having stared us in the face all the 
time: in describing emotion as magical, in the very act of transforming emotion 
into magic, Sartre’s discourse enters into the emotional structure it describes 
36. Ibid., 53–54.
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— and thereby undergoes the same magical transformation. There is, Sartre 
says, horribleness in the world, and while another philosopher might conclude 
from this that subjectively felt qualities are just as real as objectively material 
qualities, Sartre goes farther, far beyond what his  phenomenology of emotion 
would strictly require, and transforms the merest apprehension of a quality into 
a “passage to the infinite,” a “menace for the future” and a “revelation about 
the meaning of the world,” an “intuition of the absolute.” The spontaneous hy-
perbole of these phrases is no aberration: what it proves is that the description 
is also a self-description, the theory also a theorization of itself, the author not 
only the author but also the prime example of the structure that he is disclos-
ing. And, most importantly, the criterion of magic a criterion for itself  as magical. 
For when Sartre writes that “[w]e are living, emotively, a quality that penetrates 
into us, that we are suffering, and that surrounds us in every direction,”37 what 
he himself is living emotively is the very criteriality of the criterial quality: what 
penetrates into him, what he is suffering, what surrounds him in every direc-
tion is the quality of essentiality, of infinitude and plenitude, the quality of a thing 
being infinitely itself — which, in the theory of the emotions that is coming 
into being as it is being written, is not only the criterion by which a thing is de-
termined as magical, but, more directly and profoundly, the criterion by which 
the magical is revealed to the author of  the theory as magical. Thus, when he adds 
that  “ [i] mmediately, the emotion is lifted out of itself and transcends itself; it is 
no ordinary episode of our daily life, but an intuition of the absolute,”38 what 
happens is that this emotional description of emotion, lifted out of itself by 
virtue of its philosophical pathos, ceases to be an ordinary episode of philosoph-
ical discourse and becomes instead infinitely itself. Transformed into an “act of 
consciousness which destroys all the structures of the world that might dispel 
the magic and reduce the event to reasonable proportions,”39 it is no longer a 
37. Ibid., 54.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid., 59.
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statement about emotion as an intuition of the absolute; rather, having become 
an absolute intuition about the intuition of  the absolute, it is transformed into a magical 
phrase about magic. And this for reasons internal to philosophy, which, when 
it believes itself to have attained this state of pure seeing, cannot but undergo 
in a properly philosophical mode the “upheaval in our own organism”40 that 
we have seen Sartre and Feuerbach define respectively as “the return of con-
sciousness to the magical attitude”41 and the “peculiarly characteristic artifice 
and pretext”42 of the religious imagination: when the criterion is revealed as infinitely 
criterial, the definite becomes infinitely definite, and the infinitely definite, passing infinitely be-
yond the powers of  philosophical definition, confronts the philosophizing consciousness with the 
boundlessness of  the infinitely other. The infinite otherness of the infinite criterion: 
that is the magic proper to philosophy, the magic upon which philosophy both 
founds itself and founders, rendering unthinkable the very thing that it needs 
in order to think anything at all.
Such is the final throw of the die: a throw that suspends the difference between 
magic and  philosophy, between the criterion of magic and the criterion as magic, 
and, consequently,  between the definition of magic and the magic of definition. 
No longer the third throw but rather a fourth that splits off from it, not in fact a 
throw at all but rather the fourth fall of the thrice thrown die, it is one that resists 
and defies formalization. One, in other words, that demands that we leave it where 
it fell, in its scattered and discarded state, hoping only that it may one day be found 
by someone for whom it is not only an object of thought but rather a portent for it.
But the die has not fallen yet. Not, at least, before we ask the following 
questions: What does this entail for the question of defining magic? What 
should a scholar of magic conclude from this? What, in short, are we to make 
of this transformation? Should one say, in imitation of Feuerbach, that Sartre’s 
discourse is from this point onwards “an inexhaustible mine of falsehoods, 
40. Ibid., 57–58.
41. Ibid., 61.
42. Feuerbach, The Essence of  Christianity, 212.
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illusions, contradictions, and sophisms”?43 Or should one follow Sartre himself 
as he scales down from these hyperbolic heights and say with him that magic is 
always of the Other and thereby opposed to the responsibly existing Self? That, 
in other words, “man is always a sorcerer to man and the social world is primar-
ily magical”?44 Not necessarily, for there is a third alternative, or rather a second 
alternative to the reductive one that both Sartre and Feuerbach exemplify, and 
it is one that consists precisely in not reducing magic from rational thought but 
rather in inducing it. Here,  before proceeding to the concluding section of this es-
say, I will leave the last word to Roger Caillois, founding member with Georges 
Bataille of the Collège de Sociologie and onetime interlocutor of André Breton, 
who writes in an essay from 1936:
[T]he mind has always grappled with extraordinarily disturbing questions that it seems 
driven to resolve. There is, in man, a full mantle of  shadow that spreads its nocturnal empire over 
most of  his emotional reactions and imaginative processes, and his being cannot stop struggling with this 
darkness for an instant. Man’s stubborn curiosity is immediately drawn to these mysteries, 
which so strangely border on his fully conscious state. He rightly feels that any form of 
knowledge that denies them credence and attention, that deliberately rejects or neglects 
them out of indifference, thus irremediably betrays its own purpose. When positivism 
excluded these emotive obstacles from methodical research, they became the exclusive 
monopoly of emotional and sentimental forces that were unable to control them and, 
instead, found satisfaction in making them divine.45
Conclusion
The quaint little fiction that opened this essay was written in order to demon-
strate vividly the idée reçue that magic is too vague and polyvalent a term to 
admit of a rigorous theoretical definition. If the argument made in the pre-
ceding pages is at all successful, it will have effectively rewritten the story by 
reconfiguring the polyvalence of the term and thereby dissolving the vagueness 
43. Ibid., 212.
44. Sartre, Sketch, 56. See also Julie Van der Wielen, “The Magic of the Other,” 72–73.
45. Caillois, The Edge of  Surrealism, 133–34. 
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that was assumed to surround it. In the first part of the essay, I showed that all 
sentences in which the word “magic” is used must be examined as propositional 
sentences consisting of a subject term and a predicate term. In the second part, 
I demonstrated that all judgements concerning “magic” must be referred to that 
“magic-bearing” predicate by which a given thing is determined as “magical.” 
In the third and final part, I argued that the truth of a proposition containing 
a magic-bearing predicate is always specific to a class of objects from which the 
definition of “magic” is derived. In other words, magic is definable for any class of ob-
jects in which it refers back to a magic-bearing predicate; as a consequence, a magic-re-
ferring expression is always either true or false for the class of objects to which it refers.
Everything up to this point was demonstrable in a straightforwardly analyt-
ical fashion. It was only with the fourth throw of the die — or, as I said above, 
with the fourth fall of the thrice thrown die — that my argument shouldered the 
burden of phenomenological proof. Which is the same as shouldering the “full 
mantle of shadow” of which Caillois speaks. There, following Sartre, I argued 
that there is no magic without emotion. By this, however, I did not mean that 
magic is a mere function of our internal and subjective states. Indeed what was 
seen is that the contrary is true. It is of a synthetic whole that Sartre speaks, 
and it belongs to this synthetic whole that it should be a strange admixture or 
interweaving of subject and object: finding itself as an object for the other, the 
subjective consciousness is captive to the other, and, rendered passive in and by 
this captivity, finds itself unable to react by any other than emotional — magical 
— means. A final quotation from Sartre:
[I]n a general way, areas form themselves around me out of which the horrible makes 
itself felt. For the horrible is not possible in the deterministic world of tools. The horrible 
can appear only in a world which is such that all the things existing in it are magical by 
nature, and the only defences against them are magical. This is what we experience often 
enough in the universe of dreams, where doors, locks and walls are no protection against 
the threats of robbers or wild animals for they are all grasped in one and the same act of 
horror. And since the act which is to disarm them is the same as that which is creating 
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them, we see the assassins passing through doors and walls; we press the trigger of our 
revolver in vain, no shot goes off. In a word, to experience any object as horrible, is to 
see it against the background of a world which reveals itself as already horrible.46
What is important to note here is that this is also empirically true: to speak of 
magic is to speak of a world that has revealed itself as already magical. Not to the 
philosopher or researcher, but to  someone, anyone in general, to whom we owe 
the very possibility of having magic as an object of  scholarly research. Yet this 
does not mean that scholarly research is the only way to repay this debt. To 
the contrary: what the facticity of magic properly entails for the study of magic 
— what follows, in other words, from the fact that something like a belief in 
magic has taken place in the world — is the  obligation never to defer to existing traditions 
and practices of  magic. Not because we can do without them, for it is evident that 
we cannot, but rather because this attitude of deference may so easily derail the 
inquiry, making it stray from the path of thinking into the thicket of the given. 
Yes, it is absolutely necessary that magic must be discovered before it can be 
studied. But if we wish to avoid losing it to the twin extremes of denied essen-
tialism and enforced relativism, it must be discovered as magic wherever and in 
whatever form it is found. And this means that it must be found philosophically.
That this creates problems for philosophy itself is no disaster. Or, if it is, this 
disaster is where all the riches lie. For what this philosophical disaster means 
is that the recognition of magic — the event in which a philosophizing subject is 
prompted to utter a declarative statement about magic — may suffice to grant magic 
the ontological weight that philosophical reason would rather deny it. And to 
grant magic any ontological weight at all is to cease speaking in purely intellec-
tual terms of something that cannot be spoken of in purely intellectual terms. 
That is what happened to Sartre, albeit briefly, when he admitted magic into 
his ontology: in that moment of philosophical hyperbole, of an all but unavow-
able mysticism, he put one toe over the threshold, slipped a fingertip into the 
46. Sartre, Sketch, 59–60.
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parting of the veil, sent an unformed wish out into the realm of transcenden-
tal essences. Not because he told the truth about magic, for it is questionable 
whether there can be any such thing, but rather because he was able to say with 
conviction that magic is, that something is magic, that magic works in such and 
such a way and is defined by such and such qualities. For, having given such a 
definition, and having given it with conviction, he was then permitted entry 
into it — magically, as it were — and found it at work in places where no objec-
tive theory of magic would have been able to discern it. And we, if we choose 
to follow this strand in his thought rather than the other, may widen the orbit 
of his thought, finding instances of magic in the most unexpected places — for 
example among insects.
Insects? To understand this, begin by recalling to mind the last extended 
quotation from Sartre: a magical world is one from whose magical relations the 
mind cannot extricate itself by any other than magical means. Then, turning 
again to Roger Caillois, who argues in his 1937 essay “Mimicry and Legendary 
Psychasthenia” that mimetic insects charm themselves into believing that they are 
what they are mimicking, consider the following observation. “This tendency, 
whose universality thus becomes hard to deny,” Caillois writes, referring, by 
way of Frazer’s principles of contagion and similarity, to the propensity of liv-
ing beings to imitate the things and circumstances that environ them,
might have been the determining force behind the current morphology of mimetic in-
sects, at a time when their body was more plastic than it is today (as we must anyhow as-
sume, given the fact of transformationism). Mimicry could then accurately be defined as 
an incantation frozen at its high point and that has caught the sorcerer in his own trap. Let no 
one call it sheer madness to attribute magic to insects: this novel use of terms should not 
hide the utter simplicity of the matter itself. Prestige-magic and fascination: what else should 
we call the phenomena that were all grouped under the very category of mimicry? ...
In any event, resorting to the explanatory claim that magic always tends to seek out resem-
blance simply provides us with an initial approximation, as this too must be accounted 
for in turn. The search for similarity presents itself as a means, if not as an intermediary. It 
seems that the goal is indeed to become assimilated into the environment. And in this respect, in-
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stinct completes the work of morphology: the Kallima symmetrically aligns itself with a real 
leaf, its lower wing appendage in the spot that a real leaf stalk would occupy. The Oxydia 
attaches itself perpendicularly to the tip of a branch, for the marks imitating the median 
vein require it to do so. The Brazilian Cholia butterflies settle in a row on little stalks so as 
to form bellflowers like those on lily of the valley sprigs, for example.47
An incantation frozen at its high point and that has caught the sorcerer in his 
own trap: such is the philosophical magic of which I have tried to give an exam-
ple here. To  assure yourself of this, of the veracity of this description, take an-
other look at the die you have found and spent the last few hours deciphering. 
If you are still certain that a die is what it is, I congratulate you on the hardiness 
of your convictions: mine have long since wavered.
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